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Mapping the Iceberg: The Impact of Data
Sources on the Study of District Courts
Christina L. Boyd, Pauline T. Kim*, and Margo Schlanger
Three decades ago, Siegelman and Donohue aptly characterized research about courts and liti-
gation that relied only on published opinions as “studying the iceberg from its tip.” They
implored researchers to view published district court opinions “with greater sensitivity to the
ways in which such cases are unrepresentative of all cases”. The dynamic, multistage nature of
trial court litigation makes a focus solely on published opinions particularly ill-suited to the study
of federal district courts. Expanded electronic access to court documents now allows more pre-
cise analysis of the ways in which published cases are unrepresentative and what differences that
makes for conclusions about the work of district courts. Heeding Siegelman and Donohue’s
admonition, this study seeks to map the iceberg, exploring the extent to which the visible part
misrepresents what lies below the surface. Using a supplemented version of the Kim, Schlanger,
and Martin EEOC Litigation Project data, this article examines the varying extent to which cases
and judicial activity are visible in the several data sources commonly used by district court
researchers. More specifically, we analyze how the work of federal district courts looks different
depending on whether research relies on published opinions, on opinions available on Westlaw
or Lexis (both “published” and “unpublished”), or on more comprehensive data available on
PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Documents). Our results reveal vast variation in visi-
bility of cases and motions, depending on the data source used. We also demonstrate that these
differences in case and motion visibility can affect the results of empirical analyses relating to,
for example, the success rates of litigants and whether the party of the appointing president
affects judicial behavior. Our findings mean that utilizing docket sheets, now available electroni-
cally, to gather data will often be required to draw accurate conclusions about the nature of dis-
trict court litigation and the behavior of district court judges.
I. Introduction
Federal district courts are incredibly important actors in the implementation of federal
law. Today, these courts receive well over 350,000 new civil and criminal cases per year,
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compared to just 50,000 matters in the federal courts of appeals and fewer than 80 merits
cases at the U.S. Supreme Court annually (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 2018;
Spaeth et al. 2019). Because of this unequal distribution of cases across the judicial hier-
archy, federal district judges, who constitute over three-quarters of authorized federal
Article III judgeships (Judicial Business 2018), have been referred to as “the workhorses
of the federal judiciary” (Abraham 1998). For most federal cases, the pursuit of justice
not only begins in the district court but ends there, too (Carp & Wheeler 1972:361).
But while the importance of district courts can hardly be disputed, empirical
scholars of district courts face high hurdles studying them in an appropriate and compre-
hensive way. As Hoffman et al. argue, “empirical work about [federal] trial courts is more
expensive, more time-consuming, and more uncertain than one might imagine”
(2007:727). And as Levin notes, “studying the district courts in a systematic way is
difficult—more difficult than studying federal appellate courts and far more difficult than
studying the Supreme Court” (2008:981). What makes good empirical district court
research so difficult? Much of the difficulty stems from the dynamic, multistaged nature
of litigation at the trial court level. Kim et al. explain:
[A] district judge may rule in a single case on multiple occasions and on different types of ques-
tions, only a few of which could be dispositive but all of which affect the case’s progress and
ultimate outcome. Moreover, because many of the judge’s actions are taken in response to
motions by the parties, there is no determinate sequence in which pretrial litigation events
occur. Rather, how a case proceeds depends on the choices made by the parties—what motions
are filed by whom and how discovery unfolds (2009:85).
The bulk of the prior literature has identified district court cases for study through
the opinions published, in print, in official sources like the Federal Supplement or Federal
Rules Decisions (e.g., Rowland et al. 1984; Rowland & Carp 1996; Schultz & Petterson 1992;
Segal 2000; Walker & Barrow 1985; Winkler 2006). More recent district court empirical
scholarship often also includes “unpublished” opinions that are available through legal
databases like Westlaw and Lexis (e.g., Banks & Tauber 2014; Sen 2015)1.
Does studying published and unpublished opinions available in commercial legal
databases accurately capture the work of the federal district courts? We have multiple rea-
sons to suspect that the answer is no. One study (Schlanger & Lieberman 2006:163–64)
found 28,000 district court opinions in 2004 that were accessible on Westlaw, even
though over 10 times that many cases were terminated in the district courts during the
1For years, some district court scholars have used the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and Federal Judicial
Center’s Integrated Data Base (see Eisenberg 2004; Eisenberg & Schlanger 2005). These data provide case-level
information on every federal district court case dating back to 1970 that includes “names of the parties, the subject
matter category and the jurisdictional basis of the case, the case’s origin in the district as original or removed or
transferred, the amount demanded, the dates of filing and termination in the district court or the court of appeals,
the procedural stage of the case at termination, the procedural method of disposition, and, if the court entered
judgment or reached decision, who prevailed” (Clermont et al. 2003). The FJC has recently made these data far
more accessible by posting them in close to real time and with caption and docket number information at
https://www.fjc.gov/research/idb.
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same period. Schlanger and Lieberman (2006) also reported a highly skewed geographi-
cal variance:
[W]hile over half the districts (58 of the 94) produced opinions at a rate of 5% or less of termi-
nations, the others were more diverse, ranging from 6–10% to 40–45% and even (for two out-
liers) 60–80% …. Most notably, the Northern District of Illinois, the Southern District of
New York, and the Northern District of Texas between them terminated 9.2% of all federal dis-
trict cases in 2004, but produced 33.4% of all opinions.
Similarly, Hoffman et al.’s (2007) deep dive into how often federal district court
cases produced Westlaw- and Lexis-available opinions indicated that only 3 percent of the
judge actions in their four-district study led to a published or unpublished opinion in
one of the legal databases. As to why this is the case, Boyd argued that the reasons range
“from the frivolous nature of some lawsuits to the limited judicial activity required in
some cases … to the presence of judicial discretion in engaging in opinion writing behav-
ior. For these judges, many case activities requiring judicial intervention can be resolved
orally or through short, publicly unavailable orders, meaning that writing an opinion is
voluntary and, at the extreme, perhaps even superfluous” (2015:255).
Whether an unpublished opinion is included in Westlaw or Lexis is likely to be
driven by factors such as whether a judge provides written justification for her decision
on a motion, whether that written decision is classified as an opinion or merely an order,
whether the court has made the opinion electronically available, and when it was decided
(see Boyd 2015; Hoffman et al. 2007; Kim et al. 2009). For example, McCuskey’s (2016)
in-depth examination of nearly 200 federal question jurisdiction removal cases in the
Northern District of Illinois and Eastern District of Virginia reveals that a substantial
number of district court decisions are not visible on Westlaw or Lexis. While some of
these non-visible decisions are unreasoned orders, others are fully reasoned opinions—
what McCuskey calls submerged precedent.
Which district court opinions are published in the Federal Supplement or Federal Rules
Decisions involves an additional nonrandom selection process. Olson explained in her
study of Minnesota district court publication tendencies from 1982 to 1984, “[t]he choice
of which and how many judicial opinions to send up [to the reporter system] is left up to
the individual district judges with only minimal policy guidance” (1992:786). Other
research on district court publication practices indicates that key factors include judge
preference, local court culture, judicial promotion potential, case salience and impor-
tance, and the publishers’ rules, among others (McCuskey 2016; Morriss et al. 2005;
Ringquist & Emmert 1999; Rowland & Carp 1996; Siegelman & Donohue 1990;
Songer 1988; Swenson 2004; Taha 2004).
In short, some types of outcomes, cases, judges, and courts are more likely to
appear in print or on Westlaw and Lexis (whether as published and unpublished opin-
ions) than others. This, in turn, means that the district court cases identified through a
search of published Federal Supplement and Federal Rules Decisions opinions or through a
Westlaw or Lexis search of published and unpublished opinions are probably unre-
presentative of the broader population of district court cases. If “published opinions are
not representative of all opinions; opinions are not representative of all district court
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decisions; and adjudicated cases are not representative of all filed cases”
(Kim et al. 2009:97), then research designs examining published or unpublished opin-
ions will often lead to skewed empirical results.
Of course, we are not the first to recognize the limitations of some of the district
court research data sources. As Hoffman et al. put it, it is stark “how little trial court work
is explained through written opinions” (2007:727). Siegelman and Donohue, in their
extensive study of the publication of opinions in employment discrimination cases,
argued that the “body of [district court] cases with published opinions needs to be
viewed with greater sensitivity to the ways in which such cases are unrepresentative of all
cases” (1990:1137).2 Ringquist and Emmert argued that “in examining published cases
alone, we are investigating an unrepresentative subset of decisions which in turn may seri-
ously compromise the validity of conclusions regarding judicial behavior” (1999:33). But
while multiple scholars have pointed out the potential impact of incomplete data, the
existing literature on the impact of the data source choice is limited. Some studies are
dated or examined only a small number of cases or districts (Hoffman et al. 2007;
McCuskey 2016; Olson 1992; Swenson 2004). Others rely on appeals to identify district
court cases (Songer 1988) or omit motion-level activity (Ringquist & Emmert 1999;
Siegelman & Donohue 1990). One admirable study used dockets and court documents
(often obtained from court clerks’ offices), but had a narrow judge ideology focus (Keele
et al. 2009). These limitations are completely understandable, of course, given constraints
of cost and limited accessibility to court documents that hampered district court research
in the past.
But it is now possible to do better. In the three decades since the publication of
the Siegelman and Donohue (1990) study, arguably still the most comprehensive treat-
ment of this topic, advances in electronic docketing and data availability have opened up
significant new opportunities for systematic study of district court litigation. Nevertheless,
much recent work continues to restrict the number of districts studied, neglect motion-
level activity, or examine only materials available on Westlaw/Lexis. This article explores
the impact of those choices in research design when more comprehensive data are
available.
In what follows, we provide what we believe is the most comprehensive examination
to date of the implications of research design for quantitative empirical examination of
federal district courts. In Section II, we detail our data, beginning with the Kim,
Schlanger, and Martin (2013) EEOC Litigation Project data. As we document, for this pro-
ject we supplemented that comprehensive set of EEOC cases by coding the visibility of
each case and each motion across four different data sources: published opinions (Federal
Supplement and Federal Rules Decisions); Westlaw or Lexis legal databases (including both
published and unpublished opinions); case documents available electronically through
PACER; and PACER docket sheets. In Section III we turn to an in-depth examination of
the data, describing differences in the visibility of cases and court activity in each data
2Siegelman and Donohue define “published opinions” as those available on Lexis rather than our stricter (and
more familiar) definition that includes only opinions available in official printed reporters.
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source and examining how those differences vary across districts and time. In Section IV
we tease out the effects of the visibility differences observed in Section III. Specifically, we
examine when and the degree to which potential conclusions about case and motion win-
ners, case termination method, monetary and injunctive relief obtained, and the influ-
ence of judge party, sex, and race on motion decisions are affected by the data source.
Our results demonstrate that findings about district court cases, motions, and judges are
often quite different if based on more selective sources compared to near-comprehensive
sources. In Section V we conclude by exploring the broader implications for empirical
district court research.
II. Our Approach: Data and Research Design
A. EEOC Litigation Project Data
We utilize the Kim et al. (2013) EEOC Litigation Project dataset,3 which samples employ-
ment discrimination lawsuits initiated by the EEOC in federal district courts over a
10-year period ending in 2006.4 Starting with a complete list of all lawsuits brought by the
EEOC during that period, Kim et al. (2013) drew a stratified sample.5 The final dataset
includes 2,316 cases.6 Unless otherwise noted, statistics reported below include appropri-
ate sampling weights. For each case in the dataset, PACER was used to retrieve docket
sheets and (where available) relevant underlying case documents such as complaints,
orders, opinions, and consent decrees.
The EEOC Litigation Project data include information regarding the parties, judges,
allegations, and details about how cases were finally resolved (e.g., consent decree, court
judgment, or jury verdict), as well as any relief obtained (monetary or injunctive). The
data also include information about every significant motion7 filed in the case—including
3The EEOC Litigation Project data and documentation are available at http://eeoclitigation.wustl.edu/.
4The data include cases filed in fiscal years 1997 through 2006—namely, cases filed from October 1, 1996 through
September 30, 2006.
5The resulting data include all cases classified by the EEOC as intended to benefit more than one employee and
all cases concluded via a contested court order (whether an opinion or a verdict). The data also include a random
sample of all remaining EEOC cases.
6All cases without a district court resolution by April 22, 2008 were coded with “ongoing” as the case outcome.
7“Significant motion” is broadly defined and includes the following motion types: motion to dismiss (involuntary,
including 12(b)(6), 12(b)(7), for jurisdiction or venue), motion for judgment on the pleadings, motion for sum-
mary judgment, motion to alter/amend judgment, motion for judgment as a matter of law, motion to
dismiss—voluntary, motion to intervene by complainant or EEOC, motion for default, motion for preliminary
injunction, motion for injunction, motion for joinder, motion for severance, motion for remittitur/additur,
motion for new trial, motion to consolidate, motion or notice to relate cases, and substantive discovery motion.
Substantive discovery motions include matters like motions to compel and motions for protective orders but do
not include motions involving more administrative matters such as the timing of discovery or numerical limits.
Similarly, motions regarding administrative matters like the addition or substitution of counsel were omitted.
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the dates it was filed and resolved, whether the motion was opposed, the outcome, and
the deciding judge.8 These data provide a comprehensive picture of district court activity
in the cases sampled.
B. Data Extension
The EEOC Litigation Project data capture every significant motion that occurred in any of
the cases in the sample. To study the visibility of these case activities in other data
sources, we supplemented the data as follows. For every motion within the EEOC Litiga-
tion Project data (i.e., every significant motion), we determined whether the resolution of
the motion is published in the Federal Supplement or Federal Rules Decisions Reporters9 or is
available as an unpublished decision in Westlaw,10 LexisNexis,11 or both. The Westlaw
and LexisNexis searches used to extend the EEOC Litigation Project data were conducted
between 2016 and 2019.
We also coded whether the resolution of each motion, whether in the form of an
order or opinion, is electronically available on PACER, by looking for a live hyperlink on
the docket sheet.
With these extensions, the data allow us to study the representativeness of district
court research conducted with today’s electronic research tools.
C. Important Groundwork: Categories, Definitions, and Levels of Analyses
This section describes our study’s key concepts and levels of analyses to lay the ground-
work for the discussion and data analyses that follow.
When considering to what extent the activities of district courts are visible to
researchers, there are two distinct levels of analysis—the motion level and the case level.
Which one should be used depends on the research question posed. For example, if a
researcher wants to know how judges make decisions, it may be important to capture how
they decide individual motions. On the other hand, if a researcher is concerned with
plaintiffs’ success rates in litigation, case-level outcomes will be more appropriate. Our
8After extensive training, law student and lawyer coders captured detailed information about litigation activity in
each case from the docket and available case documents. To ensure data reliability, an expert coder checked and
approved all coding.
9To ensure the inclusion of all relevant opinions and orders across sources, we separately retrieved citations from
Westlaw and Lexis.
10In Westlaw, coders were required to search for relevant opinions in each of three different ways before conclud-
ing that no citation (published or unpublished) was available in the database: (1) by case name for the federal dis-
trict courts source, filtered by jurisdiction if needed, (2) by the dockets source, searching by state and docket
number, and (3) by court source, searching by docket number and party name.
11In Lexis, coders limited their searches to “All US District Courts” and then performed multiple searches for a
combination of “equal employment” (and other variations of EEOC), the state of the district court, the defen-
dant’s name (multiple variants as needed), and the docket number.
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data include 2,316 cases, but many more motions—that is, case activity that requires some
type of response from a judge.12 A given case may have no, one, or many motions.
The majority of our analysis that follows focuses on motions. Each motion is catego-
rized according to its availability in different data sources. If the outcome of a motion is
available in a particular data source, we say that it is “visible” at that level.
The four levels of visibility are:
1. Published Opinion. The opinion or order deciding the motion is published in an
official reporter. These official reporters include the Federal Supplement
(F. Supp., F. Supp. 2d, F. Supp. 3d) and the Federal Rules Decisions (F.R.D.).13
2. Westlaw or Lexis Opinion. The motion opinion or order is available on Westlaw
and/or Lexis, whether officially published or unpublished.
3. PACER Hyperlinked. An opinion or order falls within this category when the
PACER docket sheet includes a hyperlink to an electronic version of the opin-
ion/order. Some of these rulings are conclusory; others are equivalent to what
McCuskey calls submerged precedent—that is, “reasoned opinions available only
on court dockets, and not on the Westlaw and Lexis commercial databases”
(2016:516).
4. PACER Docket Sheet. The PACER docket sheet always provides a written record
that an opinion and/or order resolved a motion. In many instances, the docket
sheet text describes in detail the type of motion, the date filed and resolved, the
motion’s outcome, and the judge who resolved the motion. At times, the docket
sheet text also includes further details about why the judge reached that
decision.
Generally speaking, each level of motion visibility is encompassed or nested within
the levels below it.14 Figure 1 illustrates this relationship. If a motion produced an opin-
ion published in the Federal Supplement, it will generally also be available in Westlaw and
Lexis databases, hyperlinked on PACER, and listed on the PACER docket sheet. Thus,
12Unless otherwise noted, each observation in the motion-level analyses is based on a unique underlying motion.
This is true even if two (or more) motions were resolved by a single court order or opinion. Note, however, that
we do not code multiple court orders/opinions resolving the same motion as multiple observations. It is a frequent
occurrence for there to be two separate docket sheet entries for the resolution of a motion, with one entering, for
example, the judge’s memorandum opinion and the other entering the accompanying order on that motion
resolution.
13We also have two observations with published opinions in the Bankruptcy Reporter (B.R.). We have coded these
as published.
14For 0.73 percent of the motion opinions, an opinion is available on Lexis but not on Westlaw, and 0.6 percent of
the motion opinions are available on Westlaw but not Lexis. Under 3 percent of motion resolutions are available
as published or unpublished opinions through Westlaw or Lexis but are not electronically available as hyperlinked
documents on PACER. This circumstance is almost entirely limited to the earlier years of the data when district
court dockets were not yet required to link electronic versions of case outcome documents.
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the four categories are cumulative. The last category, PACER docket sheet, encompasses
all motions in the dataset.
At times, a case-level analysis will be more appropriate—for example, when asking
about case outcome and termination method, the type of discrimination alleged, or the
resulting injunctive and monetary relief. To conduct case-level analyses, we again capture
whether a given case is visible at each of the four levels based on whether any of the case
documents are available from that source. The difference between the case-level and
motion-level analyses is that a case is coded as “available,” and therefore visible, if any case
document (not only documents relating to a particular motion) appears in that data
source. Some cases have multiple opinions and orders, and often these are inconsistently
visible. For example, a case may have three available case documents: a published
(F. Supp.) opinion resolving a dispositive motion, an unpublished opinion on a discovery
motion available on Lexis and Westlaw, and an order documenting the in-court
Figure 1: Illustration of the four levels of motion visibility.
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resolution of a motion available through a hyperlink on the PACER docket sheet. For
purposes of determining visibility at the case level, we use the highest (most prominent)
publication or availability source for any of the case’s documents. In the example just set
out, the case would be recorded as being visible in a published source. This coding deci-
sion reflects the fact that researchers can learn of a case’s existence based on just one
document. By its nature, our coding approach is very generous toward finding cases to be
available in the more selective data sources.
During our analyses that follow, we also refer to two other sources of data for iden-
tifying district court activity: the Carp-Manning U.S. District Court Database (Carp &
Manning 2016) and appellate court data. The Carp and Manning Database contains over
100,000 federal district court judge decisions from 1927 to 2012 and is the data source
for numerous political science studies on the U.S. district courts (e.g., Rowland et al. 1984;
Rowland & Carp 1996). The Carp-Manning data are selected from Federal Supplement deci-
sions, focusing only on those decisions that contain a liberal-conservative dimension, have
a clear-cut winner or loser without division across multiple issues, and were decided by an
Article III district judge rather than by a magistrate judge (Carp & Manning 2016). We
merged the Carp-Manning data with the EEOC Litigation Project data via the Federal Supple-
ment citations.
We also consider district court cases that can be identified through the presence of
circuit court appeals. Doing so allows comparison with research designs like
Songer (1988) and Randazzo (2008). To determine which cases could be identified
through appellate data, we merge our data with the Federal Judicial Center’s Integrated
Database for Appellate Court Terminations, thereby obtaining information on whether
there was an appeal in a district court case15 and, if so, how that appeal terminated.
III. Differences Emerge: Descriptive Data
In this section, we consider descriptive differences in the visibility of cases and court deci-
sions on motions, depending on the data source used.
A. Variations in Case Visibility
We start by examining variations in the visibility of cases across different data sources.
This case-level focus is analogous to many prior district court studies, including
Siegelman and Donohue (1990). Case-level analysis allows us to examine case visibility
regardless of whether the case involved any motions or resulted in any court-produced
case documents. Cases without motions or documents leave no record in traditional opin-
ion searches of F. Supp., Lexis, and Westlaw and have no hyperlinked court documents
available on PACER. These zero motions cases, by definition, do not appear in the
15We define appeals in the most generous way possible to include all instances where there is a notice of appeal.
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motion-level data we discuss below or in any study relying on court opinions (published
and unpublished), but they do exist, and docket sheets provide information about them.
Figure 2 depicts the visibility of cases across data sources. As it shows, for the EEOC
Litigation Project data, information is available for all cases in PACER docket sheets. While
PACER docket sheets record basic information about the case, additional information is
available in about 45 percent of the cases by examining docket-hyperlinked case docu-
ments. If a researcher studied district court cases by searching all Lexis and Westlaw opin-
ions, only about 10 percent of cases would be identified, and only about 2 percent of
cases would be visible if a researcher restricted herself to published reporters.
Focusing only on cases that eventually have an appeal—6 percent of the cases in
our data—the differences in visibility are less pronounced. Still, less than 50 percent of
the district court cases with appeals are visible through Westlaw and Lexis and only 16 per-
cent are officially published.
B. Variations in Motion Visibility
One of the advantages of the EEOC Litigation Project’s data is that they permit
examination not just of individual EEOC cases but also more in-depth inquiries into the
dynamic motion activity within individual cases. The data include a great deal of motion
Figure 2: Visibility of cases by data sources; all cases in data and cases with an appeal.
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activity—a total of 4,642 significant motions (the equivalent of 6,154 population motions
once case sampling weights are accounted for).16 Cases have an average of 5.42 signifi-
cant motions.
Figure 3 depicts the visibility of motion activity across different data sources, for all
motions (a combination of discovery, dispositive, and others) and for only discovery
motions and only dispositive motions.17 While every motion is visible on PACER docket
sheets, many are invisible in the other data sources. For all types of motions, the docu-
ments (orders or opinions) resolving the motions are electronically available on PACER
through hyperlinks around 70 percent of the time. In published reporters and Lexis/
Westlaw opinion databases, motion visibility is both lower and more varied.
Figure 3: Visibility of motions by data source for all motions, discovery motions, and dis-
positive motions.
16See footnote 7 for full details on what constitutes a significant motion in the data.
17We define the following EEOC Litigation Project motions as dispositive motions: 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss,
Motion to Dismiss—Involuntary, Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Motion for Summary Judgment, and
Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law.
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Perhaps not surprisingly, dispositive motions are more visible in both published
sources or Westlaw/Lexis opinion searches than are discovery motions or all types of
motions. Still, only 35 percent of the dispositive motions in the population of the EEOC
Litigation Project’s data are discoverable via Westlaw or Lexis opinion searches. For all
motions, that number is 12 percent, and for discovery motions, it is just under 7 percent.
Relying on published sources (F. Supp. and F.R.D.) yields even fewer of the motions—just
over 10 percent of the dispositive motions, 3 percent of all motions, and 1 percent of dis-
covery motions.
Overall, then, the descriptive results in Figure 3 indicate that only a small slice of
motion activity in district court cases is visible from opinion searches of Westlaw or Lexis.
This is so even for dispositive motions. In the next two subsections we explore how the
visibility of motion activity varies across districts and over time.
C. District Court Variation in Motion Visibility
The EEOC Litigation Project data include motion activity in cases in 91 of the 94 federal
district courts.18 Visibility of this activity varies widely by district, as can be seen in
Figures 4a and 4b. Figure 4a presents the visibility of all motion activity by data source for
the 15 district courts with the highest number of motions in the data. Compare districts
like E.D. Missouri, N.D. Texas, and E.D. Pennsylvania to districts like E.D. Michigan,
W.D. Washington, and W.D. Texas. In the former districts, nearly 20 percent of motion
outcome documents are available through Westlaw and Lexis (whether as published or
unpublished opinions). By contrast, in the latter districts, there is only about a 1 or 2 per-
cent visibility rate in those easy-to-access Westlaw and Lexis sources.
Figure 4b presents similar information, but this time solely for dispositive motions.
Because of small numbers, we highlight just the five district courts with the most motions
in the data. Variability in visibility is again the norm. For example, in the N.D. Illinois
and N.D. Texas, the outcomes of dispositive motions are available through Westlaw and
Lexis around 60 percent of the time, whereas in the M.D. Florida, these documents are
available for only 20 percent of dispositive motions.
Given prior research finding differences in when and why district court judges sub-
mit cases for publication, including based on local legal culture (Ringquist &
Emmert 1999; Siegelman & Donohue 1990), variation is not surprising. Nonetheless, the
magnitude of the visibility differences across districts is jarring. For researchers designing
a data-collection project from Westlaw and Lexis, these differences matter—a topic to
which we return shortly.
18The District Court for the Virgin Islands is the only district court without any cases in the data. In addition, there
are no cases in the data with any motions present for the District of Vermont and the Southern District of West
Virginia.
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Figure 4: (a) Visibility of all motion types by data source for district courts with greatest
number of motions. (b) Visibility of dispositive motions by data source for district courts
with greatest number of motions.
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Figure 5: (a) Visibility of motions by data source from 1998–2007, all motions.
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D. Variation in Motion Visibility Based on Decision Date
Figure 5 examines differences in the visibility of motions across the years of our data.
The figure plots the overall visibility of motions resolved from 1998 to 2007 in different
data sources, for all motions and for dispositive motions.19 Like Figure 4, Figure 5 high-
lights enormous variation in visibility by source. It adds notable differences depending
on the date of decision.
For decisions issued prior to 2000, under 30 percent of dispositive motions (and
25 percent of all motions) are visible in any non-PACER docket sheet format. By the later
years of our data, by contrast, there are very few instances where the only record of a
motion’s outcome was the docket sheet (solid black shading in Figure 5); for decisions
issued after 2005, nearly 90 percent of all motions—and almost 100 percent of dispositive
motions—have an opinion or order electronically accessible via PACER hyperlinks. This
uptick in electronic document availability in the later years of our data coincides with the
gradual implementation of electronic filing in the district courts starting in the late 1990s
(U.S. Courts 2013) and the passage of the E-Government Act of 2002 (Kim et al. 2009).
Figure 5 also shows interesting variation in the visibility of motions on Lexis and/or
Westlaw. While the overall proportions are low for decisions issued in the early years of
our period (below 10 percent for all motions through 2005 (Figure 5a); at or below
30 percent for dispositive motions through 2004 (Figure 5b)), the proportions increase
substantially for the later years. This is particularly noticeable for dispositive motions; for
this slice of data, which drives the overall results, the percentage of opinions decided
after 2004 that are available from Westlaw or Lexis jumps, rising to about 60 percent for
decisions in 2006. Presumably, the increase in availability of opinions via PACER hyper-
links in turn has enabled Westlaw and Lexis to expand with little effort the number of
unpublished district court decisions they offer for these later time periods.
In contrast to the expansion of electronically available information for cases
decided in later years, there is little change in the proportion of published opinions.
Throughout our study period, from 1998 to 2007, only about 3 percent of all motions
and about 10 percent of dispositive motions are visible in published sources. This lack of
variation likely results from invariant selection criteria. Since well before 1998, West Pub-
lishers has published reporters like the Federal Supplement and has informed judges and
courts how and when to submit opinions for publication.
While motion activity during the last full year of our period is much more visible
on Lexis and Westlaw (published and unpublished) than for earlier years, nearly 50 per-
cent of the dispositive motion outcomes are visible only via PACER sources (Figure 5b),
and this is true for over 70 percent of all motion outcomes (Figure 5a).
Clearly, there is increased availability of court documents for the later years in our
time period. Our data do not allow us to observe the trend line for decisions rendered
after 2007. Nevertheless, caution regarding research design remains warranted. McCuskey
19Figure 5 tracks motion resolutions in our dataset, with the x-axis indicating the year the motion was resolved. We
exclude 1997 because our dataset begins with cases filed in fiscal year 1997, and few of those cases had time to pro-
ceed to a resolution of any motions by the end of 1997.
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noted that Westlaw appears to pull its unpublished opinions exclusively from the PACER
“Written Opinion” collection (2016:529). This is likely true for Lexis as well. However,
“[n]one of the court orders and not every opinion are tagged as an Opinion”
(McCuskey 2016:528), and—while we have not systematically tallied such omissions—we
have come across some opinions so tagged that nonetheless did not make it into
Westlaw’s unpublished opinion collection. In correspondence with Westlaw staff about
unpublished opinions, we were told: “Ultimately, … some decisions not deemed by the
courts to be written opinions are included in our case collection, while some decisions
deemed to be written opinions are not” (Kenny 2020). In short, we are confident that
Lexis and Westlaw have not closed the PACER gap in their unpublished offerings for
more recent decisions; even today, no orders and some opinions do not make it into the
PACER “Written Opinions” database, and so some motion outcomes will continue to be
missing from ordinary Lexis and Westlaw searches.
IV. Do Differences in Case and Motion Visibility
Matter?
Informed by the evident differences in case and motion visibility across data sources, we
can assess how these differences may affect conclusions often drawn about district court
cases, participants, and overall litigation processes. To do this, we examine: (1) case and
motion outcomes, the termination method for cases, and amounts and types of monetary
and injunctive relief obtained; and (2) judicial behavior.
We conduct several analyses below and set out how the results depend on the data
source.
A. Likelihood of Winning Individual Motions
We begin by looking closely at motion win rates. Figure 6 plots the proportion, with sam-
pling weights, of motion outcomes (granted or granted in part/denied in part) based on
the identity of the movant (EEOC or defendant) and the type of motion (all types, just
discovery motions, and just dispositive motions). Each panel compares these observed
outcomes across data sources. Figure 6 illustrates that the observed success rate for
motions made by the EEOC turns on data source. This is particularly true for all motions
and discovery motions, where the EEOC’s total success rate as a movant is substantially
underestimated—by 0.38—if analysis is limited to published and unpublished opinions
available on Lexis and Westlaw. In addition, while partial grants of motions are far less
common in the data than full grants or denials, when they do happen, a record of their
presence varies quite a bit by data source. When the EEOC is the movant, analysis of
Lexis/Westlaw-available orders actually over-reports partial successes, again particularly in
the all motions and discovery motions subsets. A similar pattern exists for the motions
where the defendant is the movant, although the differences are much less extreme.
For just dispositive motions, the skew based on different data sources is smaller.
There are still some differences of note—for example, outcomes observed in published
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opinions overestimate defendant wins-in-part by about 0.15 relative to the PACER-based
sources. However, the differences do not vary as much as for all motions or for discovery
motions only. So while Figure 3 demonstrates that F. Supp., Westlaw, and Lexis did not
Figure 6: Observed motion win rates by data source.
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pick up dispositive motions at a very high rate, those motions they did carry turned out,
in our data, to be fairly representative of the broader population of those motions, at
least as to movants’ success rate.
Notably, however, motion outcomes in the Carp-Manning database are less consis-
tent with the comprehensive PACER data. In the Carp-Manning data, dispositive motions
(both by the EEOC and defendants) appear to be granted more often than in the full
case population. Discovery motions are virtually nonexistent in the Carp-Manning data;
indeed, we found only one that matched our PACER docket sheet data. This skew is
almost certainly due to the Carp-Manning data’s exclusion of unpublished opinions and
opinions authored by magistrate judges.
B. Case Outcomes
We now turn from motion-level to case-level analyses to see whether observed case out-
comes differ depending on the data source. In doing so, we return to our publication-
generous definition of a case’s visibility: we deem a case visible at the most prominent
level that any one or more of its motions is available. Figure 7 plots case outcomes by data
source. The figure divides the data into four types of case outcome: defendant win,
Figure 7: Case outcomes by data source.
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EEOC win, settlement (often via consent decree), and unknown voluntary dismissal
(where documentation is not available to determine definitively whether the case was set-
tled or whether the plaintiff voluntarily abandoned the case).20 The proportion of cases
falling in these four types of case outcome are plotted for each visibility level.
Unsurprisingly, the vast majority of EEOC district court cases are resolved through
a negotiated outcome (Schlanger & Kim 2014:1568). However, the estimated proportion
of settlements varies drastically based on the source consulted. In the PACER sources
(docket sheets only or docket with electronically-linked documents), over 80 percent of
the cases settle. However, this number drops to just 60–65 percent in published and com-
bined published and unpublished sources. It falls even further, to just below 10 percent
of the cases, when examining only appealed cases.
Unknown voluntary dismissals, which make up about 5 percent of the population,
are also significantly underrepresented in the appealed, published, and unpublished
data. Indeed, there are almost none of these cases in these three sources. While these
lower-than-PACER numbers for settlements and unknown voluntary dismissals are likely
not surprising given the nature of published and unpublished opinions and appealed
cases, the implications for the litigation representativeness of the resulting data are
noteworthy.
Settlements and voluntary dismissals are underrepresented in the unpublished,
published, and appealed sources since they have a low likelihood of yielding a written
opinion. By contrast, plaintiff and defendant victories are overrepresented in these same
sources. For example, of Westlaw/Lexis-opinion-search cases, 30 percent are defendant
victories, compared to just over 10 percent in the total population, and about 8 percent
are EEOC victories, compared to around 2 percent in the population. In the appealed-
only cases, nearly 70 percent were defendant victories in the district court and 20 percent
were EEOC/complainant wins.
The relative rates of defendant and EEOC wins also vary depending on the data
source. Looking at just cases with party victors (i.e., cases that did not settle or have a vol-
untary dismissal), the defendants win around 80 percent of these cases if we examine the
docket sheets or Westlaw/Lexis visible cases, but just 61 percent of the cases visible in
published sources.
What about variation in case termination method based on data source? We have
discussed this already as it relates to settlement, but what about the other ways that cases
terminate? Figure 8 plots the distribution of termination methods for cases resolving by
court action (i.e., excluding settlements or voluntary dismissals) by data source. For all
cases (docket sheets), granted motions for summary judgment and for judgment as a
matter of law make up around 47 percent of the cases, and jury verdicts account for
nearly 33 percent of the observations.
However, the story changes considerably in published cases and Westlaw/Lexis visi-
ble cases, even after excluding settled lawsuits. Granted motions for summary judgment
or judgment as a matter of law jump to around 64 percent of the cases. Jury verdicts
20Coding for case outcome type comes from the EEOC Litigation Project data variable Final Resolution Type.
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make up just under 19 percent of the cases with some presence, published or
unpublished, on Westlaw or Lexis. The distribution looks very similar for just the publi-
shed cases. Judge opinion writing patterns (with more opinions in granted summary judg-
ment motions cases and fewer in jury trials) once again likely explain the varying
proportions of disposition types observed in different data sources.
For district court cases with an eventual appeal, the case termination methods fall
in the middle ground. Granted motions for summary judgment or judgment as a matter
of law account for about 59 percent of the appealed cases, and jury verdicts make up over
32 percent.
To round out the discussion of case outcomes, Table 1 reports details on the mone-
tary and injunctive relief obtained, across visibility level. We calculate the monetary and
injunctive relief numbers only for those cases where there is a settlement or EEOC/




Docket sheet (all cases) $221,868 0.68 0.02 0.30
Electronically available on PACER $175,290 0.88 0.02 0.10
Westlaw & Lexis cases $574,708 0.78 0.04 0.18
Published opinions $284,903 0.71 0.09 0.21
Appealed cases only $431,529 0.56 0.27 0.17
Figure 8: Observed case termination methods by data source.
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complainant case-level victory—that is, only those outcomes where some relief is most
plausible. As with the other facets of case outcomes, there is substantial variation here
across visibility level. The table’s descriptive statistics reveal that the source used to
develop a study case set can significantly affect the conclusions reached about the
resulting relief. In our dataset, the Westlaw/Lexis cases’ average monetary relief was over
$350,000 per case more than the average for the full PACER docket sheet case set. Simi-
larly, Westlaw/Lexis cases have a far higher rate of awarded injunctive relief than the full
population.
C. Conclusions About Judicial Behavior
It is clear from the analyses above that choice of data source substantially affects both
case and motion outcome estimates. Does it also affect modeling of district court judicial
decision making? In appellate court research, there is strong evidence that judicial char-
acteristics like political preferences, gender, and race affect behavior, at least in certain
case areas (Boyd et al. 2010; Haire & Moyer 2014; Hettinger et al. 2006; Kastellec 2013;
Scherer 2004). There is also evidence that the strength of the effect varies depending on
publication status of opinions. (e.g., Carlson et al. 2020). For district courts, however,
research results examining judge identity are much more mixed (compare,
e.g., Rowland & Carp 1996 and Boyd 2016 to Ashenfelter et al. 1995). We suspect that dif-
fering sources of data used by scholars help explain the hodgepodge outcomes in district
court judicial behavior research, with certain datasets overrepresenting cases—for exam-
ple, politically or socially charged cases—where judicial characteristics like sex, race, or
party of the appointing president, are more likely to matter.
To assess whether data source can skew research about the effects of judicial char-
acteristics on district court decisions, Table 2 provides the results of multivariate regres-
sion analyses of district judge decisions on dispositive motions in our EEOC litigation
data. By focusing on just dispositive motions rather than a broader array of motions, we
center on the decisions most likely to be affected by judicial preferences or
characteristics.
The dependent variable in both models is who wins the motion; plaintiff (either
the EEOC or the complainant) wins are coded as 1; defendant wins are coded as 0.21 The
regression models include three main independent variables: judge party (based on the
party of the appointing president; Republican = 1, Democrat = 0),22 judge sex (female = 1,
male = 0), and judge race (black = 1, white = 0; other races excluded). We control for the
21Partial motion victories are excluded from the analysis because victory cannot be assigned.
22Because our judge party variable is based on the party of the appointing president, our analysis excludes Article I
magistrate judges, who serve and hear cases in the federal district courts alongside Article III district judges. Magis-
trate judges are appointed by the sitting district judges of their courts. Although some prior district court research
uses a proxy for magistrate judges based on the party affiliations of those sitting district judges at the time of the
magistrate judge’s appointment to the district court (Boyd & Hoffman 2010; Boyd & Sievert 2013), we worry that
the imprecision of that measure could be problematic in the context of this study.
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identity of the movant (defendant = 1, plaintiff = 0). We also account for case complexity
with two proxy variables: (1) whether the case has a single complainant or more than one
complainant and (2) the number of entries on the case’s docket sheet.
Table 2 reports the results of two identical logistic regression models for the two
case groups of interest here: the full PACER docket sheet population and the subset visi-
ble via Lexis/Westlaw opinion search.23 Where substantive effects are statistically signifi-
cant, we also report them. These are the differences in the predicted probability of a pro-
plaintiff outcome based on a change in the relevant independent variable.
The differences across the two datasets are noteworthy. Most important are the
starkly distinct results for the judicial party variable. Based on just the Lexis/Westlaw visi-
ble motions—that is, a sample similar to that in many prior studies—judge party matters
in judicial decision making about employment discrimination dispositive motions. The
Lexis/Westlaw results indicate that Republican-appointed federal district judges are
about 0.11 less likely than are Democrat-appointed district judges to rule for the plain-
tiff’s position. However, using the full PACER data, we observe no statistical difference in
Table 2: Logistic Regression of Whether the EEOC Wins a Dispositive Motion
Motions Coded from PACER Docket Sheets Motions Coded from Westlaw/Lexis
Logistic Regression Substantive Effect Logistic Regression Substantive Effect
Republican-appointed judge −0.099 NS −0.644* −0.11
(0.19) (0.30)
Female judge 0.532* +0.09 −0.022 NS
(0.26) (0.43)
Black judge 0.399 NS 1.075* +0.17
(0.30) (0.44)
Defendant movant 1.936* +0.45 1.724* +0.41
(0.25) (0.42)
More than one complainant 0.223 NS 0.890* +0.21
(0.18) (0.31)






NOTES: Substantive effect is the difference in the predicted probability of an EEOC win when the independent vari-
able’s value is changed. NS = difference between values is not statistically significant.
23Because of a too small number of observations, we cannot model just the published data, the appeals-only data,
or the Carp-Manning data. Accordingly, we simplify the analysis by focusing exclusively on PACER data and the
combined published and unpublished data available to researchers searching Lexis and Westlaw. Our regression
results for the Westlaw/Lexis model remain largely unchanged when we focus on just dispositive motions decided
in 2006, 2007, and early 2008. Although this robustness check is based on a small number of observations (N
= 114), it does provide some evidence that the increase in the inclusiveness of Westlaw and Lexis data over time
that we observe in Figure 5b does not affect our basic observation that conclusions about judicial behavior are
likely to change depending on the data sources used for analysis.
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the voting behavior of Republican and Democrat judges on these dispositive motions. In
other words, the results indicate that party of appointing president predicts district judge
behavior on dispositive motions but only in a small, nonrandom slice of decisions. It may
be that the presence of party effects in this set of cases—Lexis- and Westlaw-available
opinions—is where it matters, precisely because these cases are more visible and are
therefore likely to influence the future course of the law. Nevertheless, the fact that these
effects do not appear in the full dataset suggests caution in extrapolating the results of
studies limited to these sources to the full range of district court judge behavior. Given
the number of studies examining and finding that party and ideology affect judicial
behavior, the differing results for the two models reported in Table 2 are noteworthy
even if perhaps not wholly surprising.
We also see differences in judge gender and race results. Modeling the effect of
the Female Judge variable on the likelihood of a pro-plaintiff vote using just Lexis/Westlaw
data, there is no significant difference in how male and female judges rule on dispositive
motions. However, there is a difference in how black judges rule; they are 0.16 more
likely to rule in favor of the plaintiff’s position. Switching to the full PACER data shifts
both results. Using full data, female judges are about 0.09 more likely than male judges
to support the EEOC or private plaintiffs’ positions in dispositive motions. For black
judges, the differential disappears. While further investigation is needed to fully under-
stand why this variation exists and whether it holds for different types of disputes and
periods of time, the important broader point is that findings about what predicts judicial
behavior depend on the data source.
V. Discussion
Because district court litigation is complex, dynamic, and multistaged, and because of the
low rates at which Westlaw and Lexis include opinions and orders, the research design
strategies used for appellate court research—that is, relying on published (and perhaps
unpublished) opinions—are often inappropriate.
We set out to explore the ramifications of data source choice in empirical research
about federal district courts. Our analyses demonstrate great variation in the visibility of
cases and case motions based on the source researchers consult, with traditional publi-
shed reporters providing just a small slice of cases and motions, while databases like West-
law and Lexis allow access to some but not all unpublished opinions in addition to
published opinions. As our district-by-district examination reveals, Westlaw/Lexis
searches yield almost no opinions at all for some districts (including E.D. Michigan,
N.D. Georgia, W.D. Texas, W.D. Washington, and about 20 other districts). Researchers
using traditional search methods would unknowingly virtually eliminate these districts
from their studies even though many relevant cases (and motions) might have been
brought in these district courts. Our findings buttress a point made by McCuskey: in
empirical study of federal district court cases and decisions, “it matters what you search
for and where you look” (2016:522).
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Differences in visibility can affect, often substantially, the reliability of estimates of
motion outcomes, case resolutions, and judicial behavior. Importantly, settlements are
much less frequent in non-PACER sources. In our data, Westlaw and Lexis over-report
defendant case victories and under-report successful EEOC motions. They also over-
report the amount of monetary relief and the granting of injunctive relief. Finally, our
data demonstrate that conclusions about the influence of judge race, sex, and party of
the appointing president on judicial decision making depend greatly on the source of
data used.
The nature and size of the differences one observes between district court data
sources are likely to vary based on the issue areas studied. Because employment discrimi-
nation litigation is distinct from many other types of civil litigation and the EEOC is not
a typical plaintiff, the direction and magnitude of the differences we observe may not
apply in other areas of litigation. Nevertheless, regardless of issue area, a nonrandom pro-
cess determines which cases are selected into sources like the Federal Supplement, Westlaw,
and Lexis. As a result, our broader point holds regardless of issue area: there is signifi-
cant variation in the types of cases and motion activity that are visible across data sources,
and those differences will often lead to differing conclusions about those cases and about
judicial behavior.
Our results counsel adoption of a docket-based approach to district court data col-
lection for many empirical district court studies. This type of research design—what Hoff-
man et al. call “docketology”—provides “a way to study litigation that informs readers
about the real content of legal rights and obligations … It enables us to quantify the real-
ities of litigation” (2007:731). It was once true that “published opinions are all we have”
(Eisenberg & Johnson 1991:1164) in district court research, but no longer. Docket-sheet-
based district court research may not be as easy as collecting a case list from Westlaw or
Lexis using traditional search terms or using a pre-collected appellate court dataset, but
it has become reasonably easy. Not only has the “development of the electronic filing sys-
tem in federal courts and the current availability of dockets and litigation documents
through PACER … significantly reduced the obstacles to obtaining detailed information
about the work of the district courts” (Kim et al. 2009:112), but in addition, other
docket-sheet-based sources are emerging, including Bloomberg Law’s database, govinfo
from the Government Publishing Office (GPO) (formerly FDSys), RECAP,24 and more
docket sheet content on Westlaw and Lexis.25 Our mapping of the differences between
the opinions and cases visible in different data sources should give researchers pause. If a
district court study relies only on Westlaw or Lexis opinions, whether to describe
24RECAP is “a free digital archive of federal district court and bankruptcy case documents developed in 2008 by
the Center for Information Technology Policy at Princeton University. RECAP’s repository is sourced through
Internet users of PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records), the federal judiciary’s pay service for
accessing electronic court records” (Boyd et al. 2013:257).
25McCuskey (2016) provides helpful details on sources like Bloomberg Law and GPO and their coverage of PACER
docket sheet data.
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outcomes or to study judicial decisions, the risks of unrepresentativeness should be taken
into account when describing findings or drawing conclusions.
Yes, “[d]ata are good” (Clermont & Eisenberg 2002:154) but more data are better.
For empirical research about federal district courts, more comprehensive data are now
electronically available, and this study shows that leveraging those data can make a differ-
ence in our understanding of the work of these important courts.
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